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From the domestic to the European: an empirical approach to comparative custodial legal advice Jacqueline S. Hodgson
INTRODUCTION
Comparative criminal justice has much to teach us, not only in our relative understanding of the criminal procedures of national jurisdictions, but also in the critical analysis of wider European norms of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and most recently, the European Union (EU). Drawing on the findings of an empirical and comparative study of the suspect's right to legal counsel, together with earlier empirical research, this chapter analyses the scope and effectiveness of the standards set by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in its interpretation of the ECHR and the recent EU provisions setting out procedural safeguards for suspects detained and interrogated in EU countries.
The chapter begins by setting out the recent changes in the European legal landscape relating to suspects' access to legal counsel whilst detained for questioning in police custody. (36391/02 [2008] ECHR 1542), it identifies the more robust protection provided to suspects through Article 6 of the ECHR in relation to the right to legal counsel, but also the limitations of the Convention approach in terms of practical application and enforcement. It then examines recent EU legislative measures for the procedural protection of suspects. In contrast to the more serendipitous caseby-case nature of the ECtHR jurisprudence, the EU provisions have been produced after several years of discussion and negotiation, including detailed studies on the likely impact of the new measures in Member States. They include greater levels of detail on how legal assistance should be provided, and all Member States are required to transpose the protections into national law.
Starting with the landmark ECtHR case Salduz v Turkey
However, legislating for the criminal processes of 28 different jurisdictions is not without its problems. The different procedural traditions in place pose a real challenge to the idea of a single piece of legislation fitting into, and working effectively within, all European jurisdictions. Using the findings from a recent empirical study (Blackstock et al., 2014) , funded by the European Commission and carried out with colleagues in the UK and the Netherlands, this chapter goes on to examine comparatively the suspect's right to legal counsel as understood through the practices of police detention and interrogation of suspects in four European countries.
1 By placing researchers alongside police and lawyers as they go about their daily work, we were able to understand the functioning of custodial legal advice in practice and to identify both good practices and the kinds of factors that inhibited effective legal counsel. As well as having different provisions in place for the detention and questioning of suspects, the four jurisdictions were at different stages in the protections they offered suspects, allowing us to compare the reception of defence rights across time as well as procedures. When applied to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the recent EU provisions, the empirical data highlights some of the limitations of these pan-European protections and suggests important ways in which they might be made more effective.
CUSTODIAL LEGAL ADVICE AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN

RIGHTS
The right to counsel for those accused of criminal offenses is enshrined within Article 6 of the ECHR, which guarantees the right to a fair trial to accused persons. 2 The Convention applies to all 47 member countries of the Council of Europe and so covers a range of criminal 3 legal procedural traditions. The right to counsel is necessarily set out in very broad terms in the Convention, leaving the mode of implementation to individual states. This is known as the margin of appreciation doctrine and allows for a range of different practices and arrangements in different jurisdictions, provided that overall, the accused's Convention rights have been respected. 3 In this way the Convention is not a 'one size fits all' model.
Ensuring that Convention rights are implemented, and implemented effectively, is policed to a large extent by the ECtHR in Strasbourg. Citizens of a signatory state who believe that a Convention right has been breached may bring their case before the ECtHR.
The Court's approach is a practical one. In determining whether the applicant's rights under the Convention have been breached, the Court has made clear that the ECHR is designed to guarantee not rights that are 'theoretical and illusory' but rights that are 'practical and effective ' (Artico v Italy, No. 6694/74, para 33) . The existence of rights on paper, but which are routinely denied or are unenforceable, will not satisfy the Court.
However, there are also limitations in the Court's approach. Whilst the margin of appreciation doctrine is designed to enable Convention rights to be applied in appropriate and effective ways across a wide variety of criminal procedures, it can also have the effect of undermining Convention safeguards and creating broad differences between the protections provided in different countries. This is further compounded by the holistic approach taken by the ECtHR in evaluating Convention breaches. When determining whether an applicant has received a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR, a breach of the Convention early on in the procedure will not necessarily amount to a breach of Article 6, if the application of subsequent safeguards has resulted in a fair trial overall. This is because the right to a fair trial consists of a bundle of rights, but these constituent rights are not freestanding; the breach of one may in effect be remedied by subsequent procedures and guarantees and so will not 4 necessarily result in a finding that the applicant has been denied their right to a fair trial overall.
Although expressed as the right to a fair trial, the scope of Article 6 ECHR covers the investigation phase as well as court proceedings; the guarantees, including the right to legal counsel, therefore apply to pre-trial procedure as well as to the trial itself. The ECtHR has reasoned that the fairness of the trial is likely to be prejudiced by a pre-trial failure to comply with the provisions of Article 6 (e.g. Salduz was an important case, guaranteeing in the strongest terms the suspect's right to custodial legal advice before and during police interrogation.
… the Court finds that in order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently 'practical and effective' … Article 6 § 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police … The rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction.</quotation> The Salduz decision is also significant in making it clear that depriving suspects of access to custodial legal advice is not something that can be remedied by later measures:
'Neither the assistance provided subsequently by a lawyer nor the adversarial nature of the ensuing proceedings could cure the defects which had occurred during police custody' (para 58). If no lawyer is permitted, the rights of the defence will be 'irretrievably prejudiced' (para 55). Salduz places particular emphasis on the danger of admissions made in the absence of a lawyer, but it is not limited to the exclusion of confession evidence. When cases are likely to go before the juge d'instruction, the lawyer may well advise silence, knowing that more information will be available within the next day or so and there is nothing to be gained by speaking at this early point. In other cases -which constitute the overwhelming majority -silence is rarely advised. Lawyers are still growing accustomed to their role and coupled with the poor light in which failure to co-operate is viewed in court (this is a process in which even simple witnesses may be detained in custody for up to four hours to provide information to the investigation), this makes silence an unlikely strategy.
In the Netherlands, lawyers were not present during the police detention and interrogation of suspects at the time of Salduz, and post-Salduz they are permitted only a 30-minute consultation with the suspect, prior to interrogation. They also receive only a scant outline of the charges against the suspect. This is typical of the response to Salduz by many countries: to allow the suspect the minimum opportunity for legal assistance that (they believe) the law allows, and, where lawyers are permitted to be present during the police interrogation, to restrict their role. Here too, silence is not a strategy with which lawyers are comfortable. They are relative newcomers to the investigation phase and have yet to develop the more adversarial reflexes of a profession that is confident in challenging the investigation and in asserting the rights of the accused.
This contrasts with the case law of the ECtHR, which sets out a more proactive role than that allowed for in many jurisdictions. Whilst assistance during interrogation is … an accused person is entitled, as soon as he or she is taken into custody, to be assisted by a lawyer, and not only while being questioned … Indeed the fairness of the proceedings requires that an accused be able to obtain the whole range of services specifically associated with legal counsel. In this regard, counsel has to be able to 8 secure without restriction the fundamental aspects of that person's defence: discussion of the case, organisation of the defence, collection of evidence favourable to the accused, preparation for questioning, support of an accused in distress and checking of their conditions of detention. (Para 32)</quotation>
As we will see in the subsequent discussion of custodial legal advice in practice, there are a number of obstacles preventing lawyers from providing this level of assistance.
CUSTODIAL LEGAL ADVICE AND EUROPEAN UNION LEGISLATION
In addition to the important developments that have taken place through the case law of the ECtHR, the procedural rights of suspects have also been the focus of attention in the EU.
Over the last decade, a range of EU co-operation measures have been introduced, the most prominent being the European Arrest Warrant -a fast-track judicial (rather than political) extradition procedure. Until recently, the focus of these measures has tended to be on the promotion of mechanisms of co-operation in the investigation, prosecution and sentencing of crime, with no real attention paid to the need for corresponding safeguards for those subject to these measures (Hodgson, 2011) . The first attempt to introduce procedural safeguards was the European Commission's Green Paper in 2003, 6 followed by a draft Framework Decision setting out key safeguards for suspects in a single measure in 2004. 7 These attempts were, ultimately, unsuccessful. In July 2009, the Swedish Presidency of the EU presented a 'roadmap' for strengthening procedural safeguards for suspects and accused persons. These protections were explained as being necessary in the context of increased cross-border criminality, as well as the activities of the EU itself in legislating measures for police and judicial co-operation. The idea was to adopt a step-by-step approach, rather than trying to agree on all of the safeguards in a single measure as before.
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The first, and perhaps the least controversial measure to be agreed was that on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, which was adopted by the In the light of the ECtHR case law described above, in which the suspect's rights to custodial legal advice are guaranteed in some detail, it may not be immediately obvious why the EU has also considered it necessary to legislate in this area. With 28 Member States, membership of the EU is smaller than that of the Council of Europe. The answer is that EU measures are more normative, prescriptive and enforceable. Whilst states have considerable latitude in how they implement the judgments of the ECtHR, and there are few sanctions for non-compliance, the position regarding EU legislation is very different.
First, Directives are transposed into national law by states themselves, but if they fail to do this, or if they are not faithful to the original instrument, in most instances an EU citizen can rely directly on the EU instrument to enforce a right in the national court. For example, Article 4 of the Directive on translation and interpretation makes clear that these services must be provided free of charge in all cases. If a Member State of the EU did not transpose this provision into national law and charged a suspect for an interpreter, the suspect (provided they were an EU citizen) could rely directly on the provisions of the Directive. Second, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is the result of cases brought before it, alleging breaches of the ECHR. EU instruments, in contrast, are negotiated by representatives of the Member States and are not a minimum threshold below which states should not fall, but positive standards to apply in uniform and consistent ways. Third, the Directives contain much more detail on how the measures will work in practice and are preceded by impact assessments in order to ensure that the measures are workable. Finally, whilst the ECtHR reviews whether there has been a breach of a Convention right post conviction, EU standards must be built into criminal procedures and so have a much wider impact.
The Directive on legal assistance was always going to be the most challenging piece of legislation on which to reach agreement. It took more than 28 months and a record number of eight trilogue discussions before agreement was finally reached. 9 The Directive sets out the extent of the accused's right to legal assistance and is preceded by a detailed 'recital' explaining the articles of the Directive in more detail. Its provisions are consistent with ECtHR decisions emphasising the suspect's right to legal assistance from the point at which there is any curtailment of the suspect's freedom of action. But it also goes further in making provision for access to a lawyer during other investigative acts, such as house searches, and setting out the importance of enabling suspects to make contact with a lawyer.
In relation to the suspect's right to legal advice (whether or not they are detained by the police for questioning), Article 3 states that the suspect is entitled to a private consultation with a lawyer prior to any police or judicial questioning; and that the suspect has the right for a lawyer to be present and to participate effectively during questioning. The lawyer's participation is in accordance with national law, but must not prevent the suspect from exercising their rights of defence practically and effectively. Paragraph 25 of the recital explains that the lawyer 'may, inter alia, in accordance with such procedures, ask questions, request clarification and make statements'. Although the reference to national law risks maintaining national differences and so undermining the strength of the provision as a universal norm, arguably the Directive goes further than Salduz in its more detailed emphasis on practical and effective defence participation. If the suspect is permitted or required to be present at identity parades, confrontations or reconstructions of the scene of the crime, they may also have a lawyer present during these actions. Paragraph 4 requires that information be made available to the suspect to enable them to obtain the services of a lawyer. This may be through a website or leaflet available at the police station (Recital 27). Suspects may only be denied access to a lawyer in exceptional circumstances, as set out in paragraph 6: 'where there is an urgent need to avert serious adverse consequences for the life, liberty or physical integrity of a person' or 'where immediate action by the investigating authorities is imperative to prevent substantial jeopardy to criminal proceedings'.
COMPARING DOMESTIC LEGAL REGIMES
Although several jurisdictions have now made provision for custodial legal assistance following the ECtHR decisions, this has not been an easy path. Reform has generally been precipitated by the judgments of the appellate and constitutional courts, the result of concerted strategies of litigation. 10 This has been effective in bringing about change, but the speed of reform has meant that there has been little or no training of police and lawyers,
proper financial arrangements have not been put in place, and the full implications of an expanded defence role in many procedures are not yet fully understood. The EU Directive now requires countries to ensure that their reforms are not simply a sticking plaster to appease any potential litigants to the ECtHR, but that they make full and proper provision for suspects detained and interrogated by the police to have access to effective legal counsel. As set out above, the EU Directive contains a greater level of detail setting out how the right to counsel should be provided.
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The legal provisions currently in place vary across European jurisdictions, as one would expect given their different legal histories and traditions (Blackstock et al., 2014: chapter 3), and significant differences remain even after Salduz-driven reforms have been instituted. England and Wales, as an adversarially rooted procedure, has a fairly well established defence role. The defence is, after all, responsible not only for representing the interests of the accused, but, by investigating, selecting and presenting evidence for the defence case, she is also responsible for bringing relevant evidence before the court.
Custodial legal advice has been on a statutory footing since the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), which provides for custodial legal advice for all suspects throughout their period of detention. This means that suspects may consult privately with their lawyer at any time (and no specific time limitation is placed on this), as well as having them present during police interrogation. The suspect is told of the reason for arrest, has information provided on the range of rights available during the period of police custody (for example, to call a lawyer, to remain silent, to have a third party informed of their detention, to have reasonable access to food, drink and rest, as well as information on the standards of conduct of police interrogation that might be expected). Detention is generally for a maximum of 36 hours.
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Juveniles and those who are especially vulnerable through mental illness or learning disability must also have an appropriate adult present before and during interrogation. 12 There is no provision for access to the police case file. Although advice is free for all suspects, at least half of all suspects do not request a lawyer (Pleasence et al., 2011; Skinns, 2011 and research discussed therein).
Scotland is a mixed system with influences from both England and Wales and its more ancient alliance with France. Until the recent reform, suspects could be detained for only six hours and were permitted to have a lawyer informed of their detention (the so-called right of intimation), in order that the lawyer could be present when the suspect was later 13 brought before the court. Following the Supreme Court decision in Cadder, those arrested and detained for questioning are now permitted to consult with a lawyer in private and to have a lawyer present during the police interrogation, but the period of detention has doubled, to twelve hours. They are also told that they may have a third party, rather than a lawyer, informed of their detention. Like England and Wales, vulnerable suspects are entitled to an appropriate adult.
In France, the picture is rather different. As part of an inquisitorially rooted criminal procedure, the defence has historically occupied a different space within the criminal process.
Procedures such as those found in France, Belgium and the Netherlands are, in theory, characterised by a centralised and broad-based judicial enquiry into the offence, rather than into an individual accused. In contrast to England and Wales' reliance on two opposing parties to bring all the relevant evidence before the court, the prosecution case is understood as the product of a judicial enquiry that encompasses both inculpating and exculpating evidence. And as judicial officers, those responsible for the investigation also have a role in protecting the rights and freedoms of the accused.
The defence role has evolved over time and is beginning to catch up with the reality of police-centred investigations, in which judicial supervision is extremely light touch and largely retrospective, carried out by the public prosecutor rather than through the prolonged investigation by the juge d'instruction (Hodgson, 2005 (Hodgson, , 2013 . Those held in police custody may be detained for 48 hours 13 and must be informed of the reasons for detention and of their basic rights during detention. There is no access to the case file. As noted above, in 1993, suspects detained for police questioning were first permitted a half-hour private consultation with a lawyer, 20 hours into the detention period. Since 2011, following Salduz and a challenge in the Constitutional Council, the adviser may be present throughout the period of detention and interrogation, though private consultation remains limited to 30 minutes and 14 the lawyer is not permitted to take a proactive or interventionist role during the interrogation.
In the Netherlands, also an inquisitorially rooted procedure, the so-called 'Salduz reform' allows the suspect a half-hour consultation with a lawyer, but counsel is still not permitted to be present during interrogation, save in the case of juveniles and the most serious offenses.
14 The public prosecutor is in charge of the investigation and prosecution of suspects, who may be detained for up to 72 hours.
The different approaches to provision for legal counsel to suspects in police custody arise in part because of the very different roles of legal personnel across jurisdictions and, in particular, differences in the balance of power and responsibility between legal actors. In
France and the Netherlands, the prosecutor is responsible for the supervision of the detention of suspects as part of her pre-trial judicial oversight role, and this is considered an important additional protection and form of police accountability. In England and Wales, the public prosecutor has no responsibility for either the investigation or the conduct of the detention period: responsibility for the detention of suspects, including access to key defence rights such as legal counsel, rests with the custody officer. The defence is an important guarantor of due process rights as well as being responsible for investigating the defence case. 15 One of the barriers to the acceptance of some ECtHR Article 6 jurisprudence and to the new EU provisions, is the fact that the safeguards are regarded by many countries, such as France, as more reflective of adversarial (often described as Anglo-Saxon) procedures. In all four jurisdictions, suspects must be informed of their right to silence and their right to consult with a lawyer free of charge, prior to the first interrogation by the police.
However, the point at which suspects are informed of these rights is not the same, and so their likelihood of exercising these rights will vary. In France, when she arrives at the police station, the suspect will be told of her right to speak, be silent or make a written statement, along with her other rights. She will not be informed of this right again -this is seen as inappropriate and to risk encouraging the suspect to exercise her right to silence. In England and Wales, this 'caution' must be repeated at the start of every interrogation. Without this, the evidence obtained will not be admissible. The manner in which suspects are informed of their rights also varies. For example, England and Wales was the only one of the four jurisdictions to require that information on rights be provided to suspects in a standardised written format (Blackstock et al., 2014: chapter 5) . Aside from the core function of the protection of the suspect's interests and deciding on a strategy in response to interrogation, the defence has an important role in explaining procedure (in some instances making good the gap in police information) and the wider context in which the suspect must determine whether and how to exercise her rights.
THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
In our recently completed empirical study of England and Wales, France, the Netherlands and Scotland, we were able to observe first-hand the daily practices of police and lawyers in different sites in each jurisdiction. The study consisted of some 78 weeks of observation of 16 police and lawyers, together with 84 interviews, and the collection of information on 384 case records (Blackstock et al., 2014 : chapter 2 and the related annexes). For the police observation phase, researchers were based at police stations to observe the police as they 'booked in' suspects, informed them of their rights and interrogated them. This also enabled them to chat with officers and to observe their interactions with other personnel such as lawyers, prosecutors and interpreters.
Lawyer observations were organised in two principal ways, reflecting the different arrangements in place for the provision of custodial legal advice. In England and Wales, there are specialist firms of lawyers handling criminal work, and the tendering process for public legal aid funding also requires specialisation and a certain degree of economy of scale. This means that firms specialising in criminal work will have a high number of police station call outs and so the researcher was able to gather a sufficient case sample by being stationed with one or two firms of lawyers and accompanying them to the police station as the calls came in to the office. In France and the Netherlands, there is much less specialism in criminal work; being attached to a single firm would not generate sufficient cases. So, researchers contacted the lawyers on the duty rota and arranged to be called by whichever lawyer was called out to the police station. This generated a good case sample and also involved a wider cross-section of lawyers. In Scotland, lawyers were reluctant to co-operate and we observed very few cases.
In addition, their overwhelming preference for the provision of telephone, rather than face-toface advice, also made observations difficult.
Police station observations were more straightforward, with researchers being based in the custody area and gaining access to interrogations in many instances. The exception was
France, where the police hierarchy refused us permission to be based at police stations. We were not, therefore, able to observe the French police informing the suspect of her rights on arrival at the police station -though we did attend interrogations and private consultations when accompanying French lawyers.
COMPARING THE PROVISION OF CUSTODIAL LEGAL ADVICE
Having explored some of the challenges in legislating rights across jurisdictions, and some broad differences in domestic arrangements, I want to focus on the ways in which empirical The right to legal counsel for suspects held for questioning in police custody is not provided for in the same way in each country: the legal space assigned to the defence lawyer differs between jurisdictions, as set out above. These differences in legislative provision reflect broader differences in understanding of the defence role -whether the defence is the primary guarantor of defence rights, as in England and Wales, or plays a more diminished part, complementing that of the judicial officer responsible for the investigation, as in France and the Netherlands. These differences are reflected in the readiness of countries to embrace a new or expanded defence function.
The lawyer is permitted to be present during the police interrogation of the suspect in Blackstock et al., 2014: 50) . French lawyers understand the role that has been assigned to them as providing minimal benefit to the suspect, whilst serving to legitimate the police investigation procedure: 'We are defenders but mostly we guarantee the integrity of the process' (iFranCityLaw2).
The arrangements in place for legal assistance prior to questioning are also very much more restrictive in France and the Netherlands, where consultation is limited to 30 minutes.
This does not anticipate detailed preparation for interview or the possibility of engaging in the kinds of defence tasks set out in Dayanan v Turkey. The expectation is that the lawyer will ascertain some basic case facts from the suspect (there is little disclosure to the suspect or lawyer of the evidence held by the police) and provide largely generic advice on rights and procedure -there simply is not the time or the information to allow for much more than this.
It should also be remembered that, in part because of lower levels of specialisation, most suspects in France and the Netherlands are seen by a duty lawyer, rather than their 'own' lawyer; there is no existing professional relationship. In addition to getting the suspect's version of events therefore, the lawyer must also gather some basic biographical information and establish a degree of professional trust -all within half an hour.
However, it is not only different legal provisions that reflect different understandings of the lawyer's role. The ways in which lawyers organise the provision of legal assistancefrom the local bar down to the individuals on duty rotas -also reflect different conceptions of the lawyer's role. In the first years following the introduction of a statutory right to custodial legal advice in England and Wales, lawyers were found to delegate this work routinely and systematically to untrained, unqualified and often inexperienced staff (McConville and Hodgson, 1993; McConville et al., 1994) . Quite simply, they failed to grasp the opportunity presented by this new role, preferring instead to regard it as a way to maximise their income by delegating tasks to lower paid staff whilst claiming full solicitor legal aid rates. This resulted in a national programme of training and accreditation, ensuring that solicitors and their representatives are fully trained and qualified in the provision of advice to suspects in police custody.
In our recent empirical study, we observed some lawyers providing the best quality advice that they could manage within the constraints of little time and case-related information. However, these lawyers were in the minority. In Scotland, lawyers preferred to speak to suspects by telephone, rather than attending the police station in person. Lawyers told us that they would nearly always advise silence and this could be done as well by telephone as in person. 16 Most significantly, this meant that they were routinely absent from the interrogation of the suspect, but advising a person by telephone rather than face-to-face is unsatisfactory in many ways. Apart from issues of privacy and confidentiality, it is much harder to assess the state of the suspect and their ability to withstand police questioning.
In France and the Netherlands, there is less criminal specialism within the local bar.
As a result, duty lawyer schemes employed lawyers from all areas of practice in order to have sufficient numbers to meet demand. This is perhaps a pragmatic solution to a practical problem. However, this resulted in suspects being advised by lawyers working in family or 20 commercial practice, with little experience or knowledge of criminal procedure. Training was minimal or non-existent and the profession was effectively allowing those with little or no knowledge of criminal procedure to fulfil a key role in advising an accused person when they are most vulnerable and most in need of informed explanation in order to respond properly to police questions.
Another consequence of the relatively low numbers of specialist criminal lawyers is that duty lawyers provide the bulk of both police station and court work. There is no professional continuity in these cases. The advice and representation provided at each phase is a one-off transaction; the lawyer attending the suspect at the police station is unlikely to represent her at court. This defines the suspect-lawyer encounter differently from a private consultation attended by the suspect's 'own' lawyer: it means that there is little investment in the case or in an ongoing professional lawyer-client relationship. This contrasts sharply with England and Wales, where the expectation is that the firm attending the suspect at the police station will go on to represent her at court -incentivising lawyers to follow cases through, negotiate on bail and charges, and so on.
POLICE ADMINISTRATION OF SUSPECTS' RIGHTS
Those who believe that reforms are likely to operate against their interests perhaps have the greatest incentive to try to undermine them. The police often regard the presence of lawyers as likely to undermine the investigation and to reduce the likelihood of suspects co-operating during interrogation. This argument has been put forward time and again -from the introduction of the lawyer during the French instruction in 1897, to the 30-minute consultation 20 hours into detention in France in 1993, and the introduction of a statutory right to custodial legal advice under s. 58 PACE in 1985 in England and Wales. In all of 21 these cases, police fears have proved to be unfounded -indeed research shows that defence lawyers are often co-operative and insufficiently adversarial, rather than hindering the investigation (Field and West, 2003; Hodgson, 2005; McConville et al., 1994) . But it is clear that the professional ideologies and occupational cultures of all legal actors have the potential to enhance or constrain the effectiveness of legal reform.
The police varied in their response to lawyers' presence at the police station. More experienced officers were more accepting of the lawyer's role, understanding that defence rights have a place in criminal procedure. These officers had also seen that suspects who received legal advice were not necessarily more obstructive or more likely to remain silent.
The police in England and Wales had the most experience of lawyers assisting suspects before and during interrogation and, interestingly, across the four jurisdictions, they were the most accepting of the lawyer's role. Some officers were still resentful of the suspect's right to a lawyer and others thought that having a lawyer there complicated their work. French police
were not enthusiastic about having lawyers present during the detention period, but they recognised that there was little that the lawyer could do and therefore little impact that they would have on the investigation. Whilst lawyers in the Netherlands have the most limited role during the suspect's detention, Dutch officers were the most hostile to the presence of the lawyer. They felt that lawyers delayed investigations, complicated cases and made suspects less likely to co-operate. The arrival of defence counsel is a very recent phenomenon in the Netherlands and it may be that once officers become accustomed to the lawyer's presence, as they have in England and Wales and to an extent in France, they will become less hostile to the idea. In Scotland, the position was rather different. It was not the presence of lawyers that officers found difficult (probably because most do not attend), but, rather, the process of informing suspects of their right to a lawyer, which required the police to administer a long, poorly worded and repetitious form (Blackstock et al., 2014: 230-234) .
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An aspect of police occupational culture that we observed across all jurisdictions was the practice of implementing due process or defence rights in ways that served police interests rather than those of the suspect. For example, in France and the Netherlands, the decision to appoint an interpreter was often not based on the suspect's need, but on the police's view of whether they could progress the investigation sufficiently without an interpreter. For example, in order to avoid calling in a professional interpreter, police officers themselves would act as interpreters if they had some knowledge of the relevant language; or they would reformulate questions in very simple terms so that they might be better understood by the suspect. This ignored the suspect's impaired understanding of the process and the charges, and took no account of the desirability of having an interpreter during the lawyer-client consultation.
This illustrates the wider point that where the police perceived due process rights to hinder or to be of no benefit to their own investigation, they were more likely to engage in rights avoidance strategies. This was often the case with the right to legal counsel, which was generally regarded as assisting the suspect and potentially delaying or obstructing the police enquiry. This view appears to be almost universal and has been observed across different criminal procedures: by researchers in England and Wales after the implementation of PACE (Sanders and Bridges, 1990) ; in France in my own earlier empirical studies (Hodgson, 2005) ;
and in Inside Police Custody, in particular in the Netherlands, where the right has most recently been introduced. It appears to be most pronounced when the right to legal counsel for suspects is first introduced.
The police employ a range of strategies. The primary concern of most suspects is to get out of the police station as soon as possible, making the most effective ploy that of suggesting that contacting a lawyer would delay things and prolong the period of detention.
Sometimes this is done overtly and directly, other times it is more subtle, with officers failing 23 to disabuse suspects who fear that a lawyer will delay things, or that the charges are insufficiently serious to merit calling a lawyer. Given that more suspects waive their right to counsel during police custody than ask to see a lawyer, it is important to ensure that procedures are in place to ensure that any waiver is voluntary and fully informed. Typically, on arrival at the police station, as part of the 'booking-in' process, the suspect is asked whether she would like to take up her right to legal assistance. At this point, she has very little to go on. She may know that she has been arrested for theft, assault or a public order offence, but she is unlikely to know the precise extent and gravity of the charges, or of the evidence against her. It may seem unnecessary to call a lawyer at the outset of detention, but very much more desirable once the police case is revealed during interrogation. Of the four jurisdictions in our study, only in England and Wales were suspects told that the right to a lawyer was a continuing right and that the suspect could change her mind at any point. In the other three jurisdictions, once the decision to waive the right to counsel had been made, suspects were unaware of their continuing right and so unlikely to change their mind. This is an important gap in legal provision.
The availability of legal aid is another key factor in the suspect's decision-making process. Repeat players in the system know what they are entitled to and how to get it, but for those experiencing the process for the first time the situation is very different. Both police and lawyers in all four jurisdictions made this distinction to us, explaining that they would tend to be more thorough with someone who was being arrested and detained for the first time. If a first-time suspect is informed of her right to counsel, she may be concerned that she cannot afford a lawyer and so decline legal assistance on grounds of cost. In England and
Wales, shortly after the right to custodial legal advice was introduced, research found that officers frequently omitted to tell suspects that legal assistance was free at the point of delivery. Many worried that they could not afford a lawyer and so waived their right to counsel. This resulted in changes to the Code of Practice, and the custody officer, who is responsible for the suspect's welfare, must now tell the suspect that she has the right to a lawyer and that this is available free of charge. In France, when legislation was first passed permitting the lawyer access to the police station (for a 30-minute consultation with the suspect, 20 hours into detention), the first things that lawyers did was to go on strike! Unfortunately, no provision for legal aid had been made, leaving lawyers unable to claim any state funding for custodial legal advice work. Proper provision for payment was then put in place, but this serves as a useful reminder of the importance of making rights effective in practice.
CONCLUSION: MAKING DEFENCE RIGHTS UNIVERSAL AND EFFECTIVE
The ECtHR and the EU have made important advances in setting out universal standards of legal assistance for suspects detained and questioned by the police. From a comparative law perspective, it is interesting to investigate the extent to which these kinds of pan-European measures are able to result in a degree of consensus over fair trial standards, which reaches across different procedural traditions. There are limitations on the extent to which the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR can or should exact uniformity of standards. This is a model that sets broad standards of the requirements of a fair trial, leaving states with a margin of appreciation in how this might be achieved. It is also clear that ECHR standards are diluted through different interpretations at the national level, and through uneven modes of transposition into domestic legislation. The EU regime is more normative and demands An empirical examination of the daily practices of police and lawyers as they implement the right to legal counsel demonstrates the depth of difference that exists in legal provisions across jurisdictions, but also the very different perceptions that legal actors have of the role of lawyers in police custody. Some of these differences can be attributed to different criminal procedural traditions and the place that the lawyer has come to occupy in the criminal process; others reflect practical arrangements such as levels of legal aid. 17 But it is important that we recognise the agency of police and lawyers even within the legal and practical constraints within which they work. Their views of the value of legal assistance are often crucial in the success or otherwise of legal reform. Police officers who regard the presence of the lawyer as antithetical to the interests of an effective investigation will engage in a range of rights avoidance strategies: encouraging the suspect not to exercise their right to counsel, claiming that they will have to wait a long time for the lawyer to arrive and that this will delay the case and so the suspect's release from custody; failing to inform the suspect that the lawyer is free of charge; and allowing the suspect to think that the case is very straightforward and so no lawyer is necessary. It was clear in our own observations that for some suspects, this served to dissuade them from taking up the right to counsel.
For their part, lawyers must also value the opportunity that custodial legal advice represents -an opportunity to influence the case at the most crucial stage of the investigation, when suspects are at their most vulnerable. This requires adequate training in practical skills as well as law and procedure. Police station advice is not like court work or proof taking in the office. It is often tense and even confrontational; the lawyer must be able to think on her feet, assessing law and welfare issues and making representations where necessary -not to a 7 COM/2004/0328 final. These included: legal advice and assistance; the provision of interpreters; special protection for vulnerable suspects; consular assistance; and knowledge of the existence of rights.
